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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DENISE A. HIRSCH,
*

Plaintiff-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

vs.
*

Case No. 20966

FRANK L. HIRSCH,
*

Defendant-Respondent.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Should respondent, father, be awarded a modification
of a Decree of Divorce, changing custody of a minor child from
the mother to the father, without a finding by the trial Court
that a substantial change of circumstances occured after entry
of said Decree which materially affected the mother's ability
to parent the child.
2. Should a prior award of custody of a minor child to
the mother be modified awarding the father custody, without
a finding that the mother is unfit, immoral, or otherwise
incompetent.
3. Did the trial Court have sufficient basis for deciding
that it was in the best interests of the child that custody be
changed from the mother to the father.
4. Is the order for modification of the prior award of

custody in the matter presently before the Court based on
an abuse of discretion of the trial Court, such decision
being inequitable and not conforming with statute and
precedent case law.

RELEVANT STATUTES
U.C.A. 78-45c-12. A custody decree rendered by a
Court of this state ... is conclusive as to all isues
of law and fact decided and as to the custody determination
made unless and until that determination is modified pursuant
to law...
U.C.A. 30-3-5. The court shall have continuing jurisdiction
to make such subsequesnt changes or new orders with respect to
... the custody of the children... as shall be reasonable and
necessary.
U.C.A* 30-3-10. In determining custody, the court shall
consider the best interest of the child...
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the case.

This is an appeal from the final

order entered by Judge Dean E. Conder of the Third District
Court on defendant-father's Petition to Modify the Decree
of Divorce, specifically changing custody of the minor child
of the parties from the mother to the father.

Disposition in lower court. The District Court ordered
that the prior award of custody by modified, changing custody
of the minor child from plaintiff-mother to defendant-father.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The parties in this matter were married on September 22, 1979.
One child, Cody Dale Hirsch, born June 14, 1980, was born as issue
of this marriage. The parties separated in February 1983. A
Decree of Divorce was entered on May 2, 1984 by Judge Dean E.
Conder of the Third District Court, awarding appellant-mother
custody of the minor child.(p.18 L3-L5).
Both during the separation and after the Decree of Divorce
was entered, the respondent-father enjoyed liberal visitation
with the minor child.
In February of 1985, father filed a Petition for Modification
seeking custody of the child.(p.20,21). After hearing in May 1985,
the child was returned to the appellant-mother and visitation

rights were specified for the respondent-father.(p. 35)
After custody evaluations were performed, trial was
held in this matter on October 15, 1985 before the Honorable
Judge Dean E. Conder of the Third District Court.
At trial respondent-father and his witnesses testified
that the child had resided with the father a majority of
of the time while the parties were separated prior to the
divorce and also after the divorce, and the father himself
specifically admitted that no change in circumstances had
occured since the original order of custody was entered,
(Transcript p.24 L8-L11).
At trial, appellant-mother and her witnesses testified
that the child had resided with the mother a majority of the
time prior to the divorce from November of 1983 until the
date of the divorce, May of 1984 (Transcript p.75 L20-L22)
and continually from the date of the divorce in May of 1984
until February of 1985 (Transcript p. 76 L16-L19).
There was also testimony from both sides that the child
was to have a visitation period with the father in February ,1985
for approximately a two week period, afterwhich the father
kept the child against the motherfs wishes for approximately
a

six

week period, after which the Court returned the child

to the mother. (Transcript p.24 L22-L25, p.25 LI and p.77 L10L22) .
Other relevant facts are that the mother remarried soon
-4-

after the divorce, has a stable marriage relationship with
her husband (Transcript p.64 L10-L14), is a homemaker, and
is able to provide full-time care for the child herself.
(Transcript p.75 L2-L4).
The father works at least forty hours per week and
usually works overtime (Transcript p.28 L19-L15, p.29 LI),
and therefore is not able to provide care for the child
himself. Since the child has been with the father by order
of the Court beginning November 18, 1985, the child has
been taken to his grandmother or a babysitter each morning
at 7:00 AM ( Transcript p.54 L19-L21) where he receives
his bath and three meals, after which the father takes him
home for the evening.
There was also testimony at trial of father's intentions
to remarry on November 29, 1985, (Transcript p.57 L9-L14),
which marriage did not take place, and father remains single.
The trial Court ordered the modification of the Divorce
Decree changing custody from the mother to the father based
on findings that the evidence was conflicting as to which
party had possession of the child from February 1983 until
April 1985, mother moved from the state of Utah for a period
of six-eight weeks during which time father had possession of
the child, both parties were adequate parents, mother had
remarried and father planned to remarry, and mother had moved
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several times.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The ruling of the trial court modifying the prior order
of custody should be reversed as it is contrary to and
inconsistent with prior case law and the prevailing rule
of law, as follows:
1) The evidence does not support a finding of substantial
change of circumstances.
2) There was no evidence presented at trial, or finding
made by the lowed court that any change in circumstance adversely
affected the custodial parent-mother's ability to affectively
parent the child.
3) A change in custody from mother to father was not
shown to be in the best interests of the child in this matter.
ARGUMENT
I. THE COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE LOWER COURT ORDER
CHANGING CUSTODY OF THE MINOR CHILD FROM MOTHER TO FATHER
AS SUCH ORDER IS CONTRARY TO THE PREVAILING RULE OF LAW.
The statutes cited above call for the prior award of
custody to remain in effect unless modified pursuant to law,
and that the best interests of the child be considered.
The prevailing rule of law in regard to matter of
modification of custody orders, as interpreted by this Court
-6-

is expressed in the case of Hogge v. Hogge, 649 Pac 2d 51,
(Utah 1982) wherein Justice Oakes stated the following,
"...a trial courts decision to modify a decree by
transferring custody of aminor child must involve
two separate steps. In the initial step, the court
will receive evidence only as to the nature and
materiality of any changes in those circumstances
upon which the earlier award of custody was based.
In this step the party seeking modification must
demonstrate (1) that since the time of the previous
decree, there have been changes in the circumstances
upon which the previous award was based; and (2) that
those changes are sufficiently substantial and material
to justify reopening the question of custody. The trial
court must make a separate finding as to whether this
burden of proof has been met.... In the second step,
having found that a substantial and material changein
circumstance justifies a reconsideration of the custody
award, the trial court must consider the changes in
circumstances along with all other evidence relevant to
the welfare or best interests of the child, including
the advantage of stability in custody arrangements that
will always weigh against changes in the party awarded
custody."
These requirements were re-affirmed by the Supreme Court
in the subsequently decided case of Williams v. Williams,
655 Pac 2d 652 (Utah 1982).
In the case presently before the court there was a
specific admission by the party seeking modification that
no change in circumstance occured, thus the order for change
of custody was improper, contrary to the rule stated above.
II. THERE IS NO BASIS FOR A FINDING OF SUBSTANTIAL
CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCE.
There is insufficient basis for a finding of substantial
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change of circumstance in the case presently before this
Court. Although each party and their respective witnesses
gave testimony in direct contradiction to the opposing
party, whichever side the trier-of-fact may believe as
to who the child was with a majority of the time, neither
party or their witnesses testified to a change of circumstance,
and the respondent-father specifically admitted that there had
been no change in circumstances.
The only change of circumstances in the Court findings
was that the child had been with the father for an eight-week
period, and that the mother had moved her residence several
times.
As explained previously, the eight-week period in
which the father had possession of the child was against
the mother's wishes. Additionally, there was no evidence that
the mother's change of residence was detrimental to the child
in any way.
There is nothingto support the finding of substantial
and material change of circumstances.
III. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT ANY CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCE
AFFECTED THE CUSTODIAL-PARENT iMOTHER'S ABILITY TO PARENT THE CHILD.
Both evaluators testified that the mother is a fit and
adequate parent for the child (Transcript p.9 L2-L8 and
-8-

p.62 L19-L25, p.63 L1-L6, p.66 L17-L18). Also the trial
court made a specific finding that both parties are
adequate parents.
Precedent case law sets forth the standard that a
prior custody order can not be changed without a finding
that the custodial parent is unfit, immoral or incompetent.
This rule of law is set forth in Chase v. Chase, 387 Pac 2d
556 (Utah 1963), 15 Utah 2d 81, wherein the trial court changed
custody from the mother to the father without a finding that
the mother was immoral, incompetent, or otherwise disqualified
to have custody. The Utah Supreme Court reversed that ruling
as improper and returned the child to the custody of his
mother stating that
" change of custody ... from mother to father after
divorce decree had granted custody to mother/ was
improper... where mother was not immoral, incompetent, or otherwise disqualified."
Since there was no such finding in the case presently
before the court, it was improper for the trial court to change
the prior order of custody in this matter.
IV. IT IS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD TO BE IN
THE CUSTODY OF THE MOTHER AS SHE CAN BEST PROVIDE FOR HIS CARE
AND WELFARE.
A general standard for custody awards was set forth
in the case of Dearden v. Dearden, 388 Pac 2d 230 (Utah 1964),
15 Utah 2d 105.
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A presumption obtains that it is for
the best interests and welfare of a
child of tender years to be with (his)
mother."

In the present case, the child is only five years old
and still in need of the care of his mother.
The presumption in favor of the mother is even greater
where the mother had previously been awarded custody of the
child. The specific issue of modification of prior custody
awards was addressed in the case of Trego v. Trego, 565 Pac 2d
74 (Utah 1977),
"...where prior order of custody has been
entered and the child(ren) appear to be
well-adjusted and happy they should not
be compelled to change their home."
It is in the best interest of a child to remain with his
custodial parent to maintain the stability of the child.
Evaluators testified that the child was normal, happy and
well-adjusted (Transcript p.62 L15-L18) living with his
mother and step-father and attending school.
The Supreme Court set forth factors to be taken into
consideration in determining the childfs best interests
in the case of Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 649 Pac 2d 38 (Utah 1982),
One of the most important factors stated is the "ability to
provide personal rather than surrogate care" for the child.
In the present case, appellant-mother is remarried. Her
husband is employed allowing mother to be at home and provide
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full-time care for the child herself. Evidence showed that
both the mother and her husband were good parents and had
a good relationship with the child (Transcript p.64 L19-L22
and p.9 L22-L25). Mother has provided and can continue to
provide full-time care for the child herself, including
getting the child off to school/preparing all meals for him,
and generally performing all tasks involved in caring for
a five-year-old boy.
On the other hand, the father remains single, and did
not remarry on November 29, 1985. The home environment consists
of a father who is out of the home working all day, a fiveyear-old boy, and a teenage daughter from a prior marriage
who comes in and out of the home depending on the whims of
her parents (Transcript p. 40 L22-L25, p.41 L1-L5). The
child must spend his days with a babysitter who provides
the majority of care for the child. As much as this father
wants custody of this child, he simply can not provide the
care that this child needs, which care the mother can and
has provided for the child.
It is in the best interests of this child to be cared
for by his own mother at his own home, which mother has
provided good and loving care for this child since his birth,
and who sincerely wants to continue to provide such care for
her child.
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CONCLUSION
Appellant submits that the modification of the Decree
of Divorce changing custody of the child from the mother
to father is inconsistent with statute and prior case law,
and is an abuse of discretion of the trial court.
There was no substantial change of circumstance occuring
after entry of the decree. There was no finding that a
change in circumstance affected mother's ability to parent
the child. There was no finding of the mother's incompetence
or inability to parent the child. There was no basis for
finding it is in the best interest of the child to reside
with his father. Quite simply, none of the requirements for
modification of a prior order of custody have been met by
respondent.
It is inequitable to both the child and the mother
to change custody based on the evidence presented to the
court and findings of the lower court.
WHEREFORE, appellant-mother respectfully requests this
honorable court reverse the findings and order entered in
the court below and return custody of the minor child to
appellant-mother as originally ordered in the decree of divorce.

Respectfully submitted,

CATHRYN JAM^SDN J U D D ^
Attorney for Appellant

ADDENDUM^TO^APPELLANT^S^BRIEF
The following are the Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law for Modification of Decree of Divorce, and the Order
Modifying Decree of Divorce which are the subject matter of
this appeal.
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NOLAN J. OLSEN
Utah State Bar No. 2464
OLSEN & OLSEN
Attorneys for Defendant
8138 South State Street
Midvale, Utah 84047
Telephone: 255-7176
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DENISE A, HIRSCH,
Plaintiff,

]
'

vs.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW FOR MODIFICATION OF
DECREE OF DIVORCE
Civil No. D84-1088

FRANK L. HIRSCH,

Honorable Dean E. Conder
Defendant,

]

Defendant's and Plaintiff's Order To Show Cause In Re:

Modification

of Divorce Decree having come on to be heard before the above entitled Court,
the Honorable Dean E. Conder, Judge presiding, on the 15th day of October,
1985,

Plaintiff appearing in person and by her attorney, Cathryn Judd, and

defendant appearing in person and by his attorney, Nolan J. Olsen^ and plaintif
and defendant having presented evidence to the Court and plaintiff and defendan
each having testified and the Court having taken said matter under advisement
and the Court having issued its memorandum decision and good cause appearing,
therefore, the Court makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT

1#

Plaintiff and defendant were divorced on the 2nd day of May,

2.

Plaintiff and defendant had been separated since approximately

1984.

February 1983.
3.

That during the period from February 1983 until lApril

1985,

there was conflicting evidence as to which party had the possession of the
minor child of the parties.

4.

That plaintiff moved from the State of Utah in February 1985,

and defendant had the care, custody and control of said minor child during
the e4.ght (8) week period that plaintiff was in California.
5. That custody evaluations were submitted to the Court and
considered by the Court.
6.

That the Court determined by the evidence that both parties

were adequate parents.
7.

That plaintiff has remarried in April 1984 and defendant plans

to remarry in November 1985.
8.

That defendant had custody of the minor child from February

1983 through April 1985, a great portion of the time although exact time
periods are not determined.

However, the evidence shows that plaintiff has

moved frequently.
9.

From the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, the Court makes the

following:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

That there has been a substantial change of circumstances since

the granting of the Decree.
2.

That it would be in the best interest of the minor child of

the parties, to wit:

CODY DALE HIRSCH, to live with his father and that

consequently, the defendant, FRANK L. HIRSCH, should be awarded the care,
custody and control of said

minor child subject to reasonable and liberal

/isitations in the plaintiff, DENISE A. HIRSCH.
3.

That plaintiff and defendant should each pay their own individual

Sourt costs and attorney's fees.
DATED this

day of OCTOBER, 1985.
BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE DEAN E. CONDER
District Court Judge

NOLAN J* OLSEN
Utah State Bar No. 2464
OLSEN & OLSEN
Attorneys for Defendant
8138 South State Street
Midvale, Utah 84047
Telephone: 255-7176
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DENISE A. HIRSCH,
Plaintiff,

]

ORDER MODIFYING DECREE OF DIVORCE

vs.
Civil No. D84-1088
FRANK L. HIRSCH,
Honorable Dean E. Conder
Defendant.

]

That the Divorce Decree be and the same Is hereby modified as
follows:
1.

That defendant, FRANK L. HIRSCH, be and he is hereby awarded

the care, custody and control of the minor child, to wit:

CODY DALE HIRSCH,

born June 14, 1980, subject to the plaintiff being awarded reasonable and
lieberal visitation rights with said minor child.

DATED this

day of OCTOBER, 1985.
BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE DEAN E- CONDER
District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE^OF^SERVICE
It is hereby certified that four copies of the
foregoing Brief of Appellant were hand delivered to
attorney for defendant-respondent, Nolen J. Olsen at
8138 South State Street, Midvale, Utah 84047 on the
tf

day of January, 1986.

Cathryn Jamison Jxxd&y

